Facts not morals
The non-descriptivist denies that. Fundamental moral rules should be independent of the culture we are in; indeed of the species that we actually are. These considerations highlight a crucial difficulty moral realists face even if one grants the existence of moral facts: they need some account of how we might justify our moral claims.
Horgan and Timmons It focuses on the significance of having moral explanations. The Myth of Morality. Drawing the contrast in this way would allow an anti-realist still to acknowledge that the properties exist albeit not as fundamental explainers and that claims ascribing them are sometimes true.
The Language of Morals. The badness of undeserved suffering cannot be contingent on a setting.
To suppose otherwise is to succumb to a misguided picture of when and why people are justified in believing as they do concerning what they observe. Other moral realists reject the idea that moral claims are as tightly bound up with motivation as the noncognitivist argument supposes. Conscience puts us in possession of certain beliefs; beliefs which make such a strong impression upon us as to arouse desires; motivating beliefs. I am merely expressing moral sentiments. A person who raised that question did not thereby reveal himself not to be competent with the terms in question. Literal Moral Truth? Of special concern is the fact that the argument seems to rule out inappropriately the possibility of establishing—on grounds other than semantic analysis—that two terms actually refer to the same property, substance, or entity. Moral judgments are true just in case they correctly report the supervening facts that depend on the non-moral base facts. A couple of ways moral realists do this is by asserting the existence of objective literal moral truths and explanationist moral realism.
Cognitive enhancers are on the rise. He confidently explained that facts were things that were true whereas opinions are things that are believed.
Moral facts and best explanations
Nature of Normativity, Oxford University Press. In this way, moral statements can be true by corresponding to the world, once moral statements are recognized as describing, for example, a psychological aspect of the world. This is repeated ad nauseum : any claim with good, right, wrong, etc. If the deflationist has her way, then it is obvious that antirealists could have truth in moral judgments. The non-descriptivist has two alternatives as well. The non-descriptivists maintain that the surface structure of moral language—and the logical interplay it displays within our use of it—is not a good guide in understanding what moral language does for us and what we intend to do with it. Cognitivism combined with some substantial theory of truth is taken up next. When society reaches this stage, and there is no standard of right and wrong outside of the individual himself, then the individual is defenseless against the onslaught of cruder and more violent men who proclaim their own subjective sense of values. Justin McBrayer, a philosopher at Fort Lewis College, says the truth of moral claims can be evaluated by analogy to the ways non-moral truths are established. Exactly what the connection to motivation is supposed to be is itself controversial, but one common proposal motivation internalism is that a person counts as sincerely making a moral claim only if she is motivated appropriately. It is even more important not to be swayed by moral language because moral reality grips us. A feeling!
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